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Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower
the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise
the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for
every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that
is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance
of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related
recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas’s argument
from strange dependence on space and time, and Wilkinson’s Indology
argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persua-
sive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a
separability principle in the first case, and a reflection principle in the
second) are inconsistent with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is
possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted
versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible
general principles tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those
same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support
Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange.
Not madness but the
mathematics of eternity drove
them.
Mary Doria Russell, The Sparrow
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1 Almost certainly pointless, but good?
Kayla has a minor cough. She knows it is probably nothing
serious—very likely it’s just her seasonal allergies—but there is
a small chance that it is COVID-19. She decides that she had
better skip her mother’s birthday celebration this year. It will al-
ready be a much smaller gathering this year than usual, but her
grandfather will be there, and she doesn’t want to risk giving
him COVID. Still, the choice breaks Kayla’s heart; she knows
her mother will be deeply disappointed. Part of what makes
it so frustrating is that she knows that her cough is probably
nothing—so she feels like she is giving up something important
for nothing.
Choices like Kayla’s are frustrating; even so, sometimes it is best to give
up something morally important, even though very probably no good will
come of the sacrifice. This can happen when the stakes are high enough.
Disappointing her mother is a bad thing, but not nearly as bad as giving
her grandfather a deadly disease.
How far can such trade-offs take us? What if the probability of losing some-
thing important seems negligibly tiny, but what would be lost is unbearably
immense—trillions of lives, whole worlds of good? Can it be worthwhile
to make weighty sacrifices to avoid such risks, even though the sacrifices
are almost certainly pointless?
Bostrom (2003) considers space settlement. He argues:
[T]he Virgo Supercluster could contain 1023 biological humans
… What matters for present purposes is not the exact numbers
but the fact that they are huge. (p. 309)
Thus, according to Bostrom, it is of paramount importance that we ensure
that humanity reaches as much of the potentially habitable universe as pos-
sible. Oneway this could be thwarted is if an existential catastrophewere to
“either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and dras-
tically curtail its potential.” (p. 310) Bostrom’s “most conservative” estimate
suggests that reducing existential risk by just one in a million million mil-
lion millon would be better than saving a hundred thousand human lives
directly. He concludes:
For standard utilitarians, priority number one, two, three and
four should consequently be to reduce existential risk.
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Many others have been taken with this line of thought; they have also
worked to generalize similar lessons beyond the concerns of just “standard
utilitarians” to a broader range of ethical starting points (Ord 2020; Greaves
and MacAskill 2021). But this conclusion is troubling. Making such a sacri-
fice would have a 99.9999999999999999999999% chance of doing no good
at all—in which case it amounts to sacrificing a hundred thousand lives for
naught. This seems fanatical.1
Are such sacrifices good? Or is there some limit to how tiny the probability
of doing any good can be for a given sacrifice to be warranted? The general
question is whether the following principle is true.2
(Positive) Fanaticism. For any finite good 𝑥 and for any non-zero probabil-
ity 𝑝, there is some finite good 𝑦 such that it is better to have 𝑦 with
probability 𝑝 than to have 𝑥 for sure.
Bostrom’s case involves sacrificing something good for a small chance of
great gain. In contrast, Kayla’s case involves sacrificing something good
to avoid a small chance of great loss. This corresponds to a dual form of
Fanaticism:
Negative Fanaticism. For any finite loss 𝑥 and any non-zero probability 𝑝,
there is some finite loss 𝑦 such that it is better to have 𝑥 for sure than
to have 𝑦 with probability 𝑝.
It is natural, though not logically inevitable, that the two theses should go to-
gether. If the goods that warrant positive fanaticism involve large numbers
of happy people, or long ages of flourishing, then there are corresponding
evils involving large numbers of suffering people, or eons of despair. In
what follows we will primarily focus on the positive thesis, for economy of
presentation.
There are two ideas built into Fanaticism: an axiological idea about how
good things are, and a decision-theoretic idea about how to weigh risks.
The axiological idea is that some things are extremely valuable—for
Bostrom’s argument, these are extremely large happy populations. The
decision-theoretic idea is that an absurdly small chance of something
extremely valuable can be worth a large cost. Accordingly, intuitively there
are two different ways in which one might reject Fanaticism. One might
reject the axiological thought, and hold that value is bounded. Nothing is
1This is Bostrom’s term from another context (2011), which seems to have caught on.
2See appendix A for technical background assumptions.
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good enough to warrant some sacrifices at small odds. Or one might reject
the decision-theoretic thought, and hold that when it comes to “fanatical”
trade-offs, the option that maximizes expected value is not best. One might
say that cardinal value comes apart from the cardinal utility function whose
expectation ought to be maximized—and furthermore, this utility function
is bounded.3 Or one might hold that one should discount sufficiently small
probabilities, rounding them down to zero (see Smith 2014; Monton 2019;
Beckstead and Thomas 2020, sec. 2.3). Even if some things are extremely
good, perhaps a very small chance of such a thing is not good in proportion
to its chance.
It is not always easy to separate the axiological idea from the decision-
theoretic idea: that requires us to make sense of a cardinal scale of value
apart from how values are weighed in trading off risks. Some theories
allow us to make sense of such a scale, but not all do. But we do not have
to disentangle the two ideas in order to evaluate Fanaticism.
Why would anyone be tempted to Fanaticism? One way in is from what
Bostrom called a “standard utilitarian” starting point. This package in-
cludes a totalist axiology, according to which very large happy populations
are extremely good. It also includes an expectational decision theory,
according to which the value of a chance 𝑝 at getting an outcome 𝑥 is given
by multiplying the value of 𝑥 by 𝑝. A huge number multiplied by a tiny
number can still be very big.
But Fanaticism itself is not tied to either part of this specific picture. Not
all ways of rejecting totalism or expectationalism are ways of escaping Fa-
naticism. And there are much more general arguments for Fanaticism that
do not rely on Bostrom’s starting point. In this essay I will be focus on two
closely related, interesting, and powerful arguments for Fanaticism: the ar-
gument from strange dependence on distant space and time from Beckstead and
Thomas (2020), and the Indology argument from Wilkinson (forthcoming).
The Fanaticism thesis concerns very large finite values. We can contrast
fanatical wagers with properly Pascalian wagers, which intuitively have in-
finite values at stake. But it turns out that there are many tight connections
between large finite values and infinite values. This essay is about those
connections—and specifically how infinite lotteriesmake trouble for certain
3Or one might take on a permissive theory of risk of the kind advocated by Tarsney
(2020), which says that no particular cardinal utility function is mandatory. More on this in
section 3.
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arguments for Fanaticism. Cases involving infinitely many possibilities or
infinite values raise many paradoxes, but I am convinced that this is not a
reason to ignore such cases, but rather to take them seriously, and pay at-
tention to what they can teach us. What can the basic principles of value be
like, if they are not to fall into contradiction? (Furthermore, one of the two
arguments I am addressing—Wilkinson’s Indology argument—already re-
lies on infinite cases.)
I do not ultimately find either of the two arguments for Fanaticism persua-
sive. But let’s be clear: my aim here is not to settle the question of whether
Fanaticism is true. I don’t know. Whatever the truth of thematter, the ethics
of huge numbers is deeply weird and full of surprises. This is something
we must face up to. Some paradoxes of infinity are mere intellectual cu-
riosities, but these puzzles are of real practical importance. As Hutchinson
(2021) puts it :
The future of sentient beings is potentially unimaginably large.
That means if we have only a very small chance of affecting it in
a lasting and positive way, taking that chance is worth it.
We have actions available that amount to taking such chances, but which
involve substantial sacrifices of other important goods. For example, we
might choose to divert resources that could prevent thousands of cases of
malaria to instead very slightly reduce the risk of extreme catastrophes from
climate change, or artificial intelligence, or pandemics. Since we face gen-
uine options like this, our actual moral predicament is puzzling and trou-
bling.
2 The argument from strange dependence on distant
space and time
Beckstead and Thomas (2020, sec. 3.2) argue that if Fanaticism is false, then
it turns out that which prospects are best depends on what is going on in
far away places and times in weird ways.
Their argument is framed in terms of bringing into existence large numbers
of happy people—though as we will see below, it generalizes considerably.
For now, let us make the simplifying assumption that all that matters in
each outcome is the total number of happy lives: any two outcomes that
agree on this number are equally good. (We suppose there is no inequality:
all of the different lives in question involve the same amount of happiness.)
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It will be helpful to introduce some notation. If 𝑝 is a probability and 𝑛
is a number, write 𝑝 ∗ 𝑛 for a prospect that results in 𝑛 happy lives with
probability 𝑝, and otherwise zero lives with probability 1−𝑝. For prospects
𝑋 and𝑌 , we’ll use the notation𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 tomean that𝑋 is strictly better than
𝑌 . In this setting, we can rewrite Fanaticism like this:
For any number of happy lives 𝑛, and for any probability 𝑝 > 0,
there is some number of happy lives 𝑁 such that 𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 ≻ 1 ∗ 𝑛.
(Beckstead and Thomas call this conclusion “Recklessness.”)
The argument is based on three ideas. The first idea is simple: it is better to
have a much higher chance of many more happy lives, than a smaller chance
of fewer. In symbols,4
More is Better. For probabilities 𝑝 ≫ 𝑞 and numbers 𝑁 ≫ 𝑛,
𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 ≻ 𝑞 ∗ 𝑛
This seems hard to argue with. It follows from the idea that a much larger
happy populations is at least as good as a smaller happy population, to-
gether with very modest principles about risk.
The second idea is that the first idea is still true even if you don’t know how
many happy people there are in distant galaxies. For prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 ,
let 𝑋 + 𝑌 be a prospect that, in any state of nature 𝑠, results in the happy
people that result from 𝑋 in 𝑠 as well as the happy people that result from
𝑌 in 𝑠—intuitively, with the 𝑌 people all living in some distant galaxy that
we have no way of affecting.
The trick is then to consider “nearby” prospects of the form 𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 and 𝑞 ∗ 𝑛,
together with a “distant galaxy” prospect whose uncertainty lines up with
the local uncertainty in the right way: see table 1. In the first row we have
a prospect of the form 𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 , and in the second row we have a prospect of
the form 𝑞 ∗ 𝑛. In the third row we have the distant galaxy prospect, which
results in the same smaller number of happy lives 𝑛 only in the case where
4The “much greater than” notation ≫ implicitly builds in some non-obvious quantifica-
tional structure, which is a bit complicated to spell out. But let’s not quibble: I am happy to
grant a simpler, stronger premise:
For any probabilities 𝑝 > 𝑞 and any number 𝑛, there is some number 𝑁 such
that 𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 ≻ 𝑞 ∗ 𝑛.
This is a consequence of Stochastic Dominance, discussed below.
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the 𝑝 ∗ 𝑁 prospect succeeds. The final two rows show the result of adding
together each local prospect with the fixed distant galaxy prospect.
Table 1: The “local” prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 are combined with a
“distant galaxy” prospect 𝐴.
Prospect 𝑝 𝑞 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑞
𝑋 𝑁 0 0
𝑌 0 𝑛 0
𝐴 𝑛 0 0
𝑋 + 𝐴 𝑛 + 𝑁 0 0
𝑌 + 𝐴 𝑛 𝑛 0
Comparing the two combined prospects𝑋 +𝐴 and 𝑌 +𝐴, we observe that
𝑋 + 𝐴 has a slightly lower probability 𝑝 of a much larger number of people
𝑛 + 𝑁 . So the two ideas so far imply:
Anti-Timidity. For any probabilities 𝑝 ≫ 𝑞 and numbers 𝑁 ≫ 𝑛,
𝑝 ∗ (𝑛 + 𝑁) ≻ (𝑝 + 𝑞) ∗ 𝑛
In other words, a chance at a sufficiently large number of happy lives is
better than a slightly higher chance of a much smaller number of happy lives.
The third idea of the argument is thatAnti-Timidity implies Fanaticism. This
is the central observation of Beckstead and Thomas’s rich paper, which is
based on a “continuum” argument (see also Wilkinson, forthcoming, sec.
4). Here is the basic idea. Suppose you are about to make a world with 𝑛
happy lives, for sure. Then you are offered a trade: instead of just 𝑛 lives
for sure, you can create a much larger number of lives almost for sure. Anti-
Timidity says that this is good trade: better to have chance 𝑝 = 1 − 𝜀 of
many more happy lives than the slightly higher chance 1 of just 𝑛 lives. So
you take it. Then you are offered another trade: what about the slightly
smaller chance 1 − 2𝜀 of even more lives? Anti-Timidity recommends this
trade, too. And so on, until you are left with a ridiculously tiny probability
of a truly enormous number of lives. By transitivity, this absurdly long odds
gamble is better than the sure thing you began with.
(Some deny that betterness is transitive (for example, Temkin 2012), which
would block this argument. In order to keep things under control, I will not
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take up this idea here. Throughout this essay I will assume without further
comment that goodness is ordered: in particular, at least as good is transitive
and reflexive, and better, worse, and equally good are related to at least as good
in the usual ways. I do not generally assume betterness is a complete order—
different goods may be incomparable, as we will discuss later.)
Youmight wonder: why somuch bother in order to argue for Anti-Timidity,
by way of considerations about distant galaxies? The principle already
sounds very plausible without all that. The trouble is that (if betterness
is an order) consistency demands either Timidity or Fanaticism—and either
one of these is quite implausible. We face counterintuitive consequences no
matter what we say. To make progress, Beckstead and Thomas explore var-
ious costs on each side. The argument we are here considering shows that
strange dependence on distant space and time is one of the costs of Timidity.
The step from Anti-Timidity to Fanaticism is just math. More is Better—
the idea that a much larger probability of many more happy lives is better
than a much smaller probability of fewer happy lives—seems pretty unim-
peachable. So the key step to examine is the move from More is Better to
Anti-Timidity. What motivated this was the idea that if More is Better, then
more is still better given arbitrary uncertainty about what is going on far
away. Here is a general principle that would underwrite such reasoning:
Separability. For any prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , and 𝐴,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 + 𝐴 ≻ 𝑌 + 𝐴
More is Better told us that 𝑝∗𝑁 ≻ 𝑞 ∗𝑛; then Separability tells us that 𝑝∗𝑁
added together with the additional gamble 𝑝 ∗ 𝑛 far away is likewise better
than 𝑞∗𝑛 added together with same additional gamble—which amounts to
Anti-Timidity. We can sum up Beckstead and Thomas’s core idea as follows.
Theorem 1 (Beckstead and Thomas). If all that matters is the number of happy
lives, More is Better and Separability together imply Fanaticism.
Separability is a highly plausible principle. How could distant lives com-
pletely unconnected to our actions make any difference to what it is best to
do about the here and now? More is Better is also hard to argue with, and
the assumption that the numbers are all that matter looks like a harmless
idealization. So this seems like a very strong argument for Fanaticism.
Nonetheless, I am convinced that it is unsound: either Separability is false,
or else (of necessity) the numbers are not all that matters. This is due to
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a striking result originally proved by Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane
(2009), and applied to population ethics by Goodsell (forthcoming). The ar-
gument I’ll give below is an application of their proofs withminormodifica-
tions. It is closely related to the St. Petersburg paradox. As with Beckstead
and Thomas’s argument, for now we’ll hold onto the simplifying assump-
tion that all thatmatters is the number of happy lives, and so good outcomes
can just be thought of as natural numbers. Later we will generalize.
Consider a lottery for happy lives 𝑊 (table 2). A fair coin is flipped until it
comes up heads. If it’s heads on the first flip, there are two happy lives. If
it’s heads on the second flip, there are four; if the third, eight; and so on.
Now consider another lottery𝑋 which has the same probabilities as𝑊 , but
slightly worse outcomes: where 𝑊 has probability 2−𝑛 of 2𝑛 happy lives,
𝑋 has probability 2−𝑛 of 2𝑛 − 1 happy lives. It seems clear that 𝑊 is better
than 𝑋.
Consider also a third lottery 𝑌 which is isomorphic to 𝑋. Then 𝑊 is better
than 𝑌 as well.
Table 2: Three population lotteries. The lottery 𝑊 is better
than either 𝑋 or 𝑌 .
1/2 1/4 1/8 ⋯
𝑊 2 4 8 ⋯
𝑋 1 3 7 ⋯
𝑌 1 3 7 ⋯
Now Separability tells us that two copies of 𝑊—one around here and the
other in a distant galaxy—is better than 𝑋 around here and 𝑌 in a distant
galaxy. Since 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋, it is better nearby, and since 𝑊 ≻ 𝑌 , it is better far
off; so 𝑊 + 𝑊 is better than 𝑋 + 𝑌 all around.5
Now here’s the trick. I told you what probabilities these lotteries assigned
to their various outcomes, but I didn’t tell you how the outcomes were ar-
ranged across states of nature. We do it in a tricky way (see table 3). As we
said, the outcome of lottery 𝑊 is based on flipping a fair coin until it first
lands heads. In addition to those coin flips, we also flip one extra coin—the
5To be explicit, we can do this in two steps. First, since 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋, by Separability 𝑊 +
𝑊 ≻ 𝑋 + 𝑊 . Second, since 𝑊 ≻ 𝑌 , by a second application of Separability 𝑋 + 𝑊 ≻
𝑋 + 𝑌 .
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“bonus coin.” For 𝑊 , we simply ignore the bonus coin and get the same
result however it comes up.
For 𝑋, if the bonus coin comes up heads you just get one happy life for
sure, ignoring all the other coin flips. If the bonus coin comes up tails you
get twice the outcome of 𝑊 , minus one happy life. Note that this agrees
with the probabilities in table 2: probability 1/2 of 1 life, 1/4 of 3, 1/8 of 7,
and so on.
For 𝑌 , if the bonus coin comes up tails you just get one happy life, and if it
comes up heads, then you get twice the outcome of 𝑊 minus one happy life.
Again, this agrees with the probabilities in table 2.
Table 3: How the outcomes are arranged across different
states. 𝐻, 𝑛 is the event where the bonus coin comes up
heads, and the first heads in the St. Petersburg sequence is
on the 𝑛th flip. Likewise 𝑇 , 𝑛 means the bonus coin comes
up tails.
𝐻, 1 𝐻, 2 𝐻, 3 ⋯ 𝑇 , 1 𝑇 , 2 𝑇 , 3 ⋯
𝑊 2 4 8 ⋯ 2 4 8 ⋯
𝑋 1 1 1 ⋯ 3 7 15 ⋯
𝑌 3 7 15 ⋯ 1 1 1 ⋯
𝑋 +𝑌 4 8 16 ⋯ 4 8 16 ⋯
Now, when these lotteries are lined up this way, what happens if you get
both 𝑋 and 𝑌 ? It’s the same as 𝑊 + 𝑊 ! In every state, 𝑋 + 𝑌 and 𝑊 + 𝑊
result in precisely the same number of happy lives. In short, since 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋
and 𝑊 ≻ 𝑌 , Separability tells us:
𝑊 + 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋 + 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋 + 𝑌 ∼ 𝑊 + 𝑊
But this cannot be.
This argument relied on some reasoning that I did not make explicit: it ini-
tially seemed clear that 𝑊 ≻ 𝑋 and 𝑊 ≻ 𝑌 —but why? The key thing
is that, for any outcome you might get from 𝑋, the lottery 𝑊 is at least as
likely to give you an outcome that good or better. 𝑊 is as likely as 𝑋 to give
you at least one happy life, more likely than 𝑋 to give you at least two, as
likely to give you at least three, and so on. However well 𝑋 might go, 𝑊
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is at least as likely to turn out so well, and in some cases even more likely.
So 𝑊 seems clearly better than 𝑋. The same goes for 𝑌 .
Here is the general principle that underlies this reasoning. In general, for a
prospect 𝑋 and an outcome 𝑥, let 𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] be shorthand for the probabil-
ity that 𝑋 turns out at least as well as 𝑥.
Stochastic Dominance. Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 be prospects. If for every outcome 𝑥,
𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] ≤ 𝑃 [𝑌 ≿ 𝑥]
then 𝑋 ≾ 𝑌 . If, furthermore, for some outcome 𝑥,
𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] < 𝑃 [𝑌 ≿ 𝑥]
then 𝑋 ≺ 𝑌 .
Stochastic Dominance is a fairly uncontroversial principle of decision
theory—even among those who reject other parts of standard expected
decision theory (such as Quiggin 1993; Buchak 2013), and even in settings
where other parts of standard expectational decision theory give out (see
for example Easwaran 2014).6
Here is another way of putting the point. Consider another lottery 𝑋′,
which results in 2𝑛 − 1 happy lives if the first heads in the St. Petersburg
sequence of coin flips comes on the 𝑛th flip (see table 4). Then 𝑋 and 𝑋′
are just rearrangements: they each have exactly the same probability of re-
sulting in any particular outcome. That is to say, 𝑋 and 𝑋′ are stochastically
equivalent prospects. So it seems clear that 𝑋 and 𝑋′ are equally good.
But also, 𝑊 is clearly better than 𝑋′: for in fact it is sure to turn out better
than 𝑋′ no matter what happens. That is, 𝑊 (strictly) statewise dominates
𝑋. However the coin flips turn out, 𝑋′ gives you 2𝑛 −1 happy lives, while
𝑊 gives you one more than that. So 𝑊 seems clearly better than 𝑋′.
6For other defenses of Stochastic Dominance, on which I here draw, see Tarsney (2020,
8); Wilkinson (forthcoming, 10); Bader (2018).
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Table 4: The lottery 𝑊 strictly dominates a lottery 𝑋′ which
is stochastically equivalent to 𝑋.
𝐻, 1 𝐻, 2 𝐻, 3 ⋯ 𝑇 , 1 𝑇 , 2 𝑇 , 3 ⋯
𝑊 2 4 8 ⋯ 2 4 8 ⋯
𝑋′ 1 3 7 ⋯ 1 3 7 ⋯
More generally, if a prospect 𝑌 stochastically dominates a prospect 𝑋, then
there is some prospect 𝑋′ which is stochastically equivalent to 𝑋, while 𝑌
statewise dominates 𝑋′.7 So Stochastic Dominance follows from two ideas:
Stochastic Equivalence. Stochastically equivalent prospects are equally
good.
Statewise Dominance. If 𝑌 statewise dominates 𝑋, then 𝑌 is better than
𝑋.
Could either of these ideas go wrong?
What if stochastically equivalent prospects are not equally good? This is the
lesson Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2009) drew.8 This would mean
that something else must matter for how good prospects are besides the
probabilities they assign to each outcome. In fact, I do thinkwe can imagine
cases where this is plausible.9 But in the case at hand, it is hard to think of
7This relies on outcomes having certain structure. The structure of the real numbers
suffices, and the principle is usually stated in a context where this is assumed. But we will
not generally assume this here. In the general case, the principle requires reformulation.
Even so, all of the appeals to Stochastic Dominance in this essay can be replaced by appeals
to Stochastic Equivalence and Statewise Dominance. So we can ignore this detail.
I also note that the standard version of Stochastic Dominance stated here corresponds to
strong statewise dominance. (𝑌 strongly dominates 𝑋 iff 𝑌 is sure to be at least as good
as 𝑋, and might be strictly better.) But for the arguments that follow, strict statewise dom-
inance suffices—and this distinction may be philosophically important. (𝑌 strictly domi-
nates 𝑋 iff 𝑌 is sure to be strictly better than 𝑋.) We can give an alternative formulation
of Stochastic Dominance that corresponds to this weaker condition, and which would also
suffice for the arguments in this essay.
If for every outcome 𝑥 there is some outcome 𝑦 ≻ 𝑥 such that 𝑃[𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] ≤
𝑃[𝑌 ≿ 𝑦], then 𝑋 ≺ 𝑌 .
8It is further developed in Lauwers and Vallentyne (2016); Lauwers and Vallentyne
(2017). Bales, Cohen, and Handfield (2014) gives a different argument against Stochastic
Equivalence, which I discuss in section 3 below.
9For example, the probability of an ideally sharp dart hitting a particular point may be
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what that something else could be. We would need to say that when it comes
to gambles that only depend on the outcome of coin flips, it can make a
moral difference which coin flips they are. The prospect 𝑋′ results in 2𝑛 −1
happy lives if the first heads in the sequence of St. Petersburg coin flips
is on the 𝑛th flip. But we can also consider the extended sequence, which
starts with the bonus coin flip, and is followed by the usual St. Petersburg
sequence. The prospect 𝑋 results in 2𝑛 − 1 happy lives if the first heads in
the extended sequence is on the 𝑛th flip. So if 𝑋 and 𝑋′ are not equally good,
then it matters morally which of these two sequences of coin flips we use.
This seems untenable. I am open to the idea that some kind of isomorphism
between prospects which is stronger than stochastic equivalence is required
to ensure that prospects are equally good. But my guess is that when we
spell this notion out in any plausible way, the prospects 𝑋 and 𝑋′ will still
count as isomorphic even in the stronger sense.
What if Statewise Dominance fails? In that case, I’m not sure what we’re
doing when we compare how good prospects are. As many others have
emphasized (for example, Schoenfield 2014, 268), what we ultimately care
about is how well things turn out; choosing better prospects is supposed to
guide us toward achieving better outcomes. In light of this, if dominance
reasoning is wrong, then I don’t want to be right. If𝐴 is sure to turn out bet-
ter than 𝐵, then this tells us precisely the thing that betterness-of-prospects
is supposed to be a guide to. A guide that does not lead us to our destination,
when we already know exactly how to get there, is not worth following.10
We should not utterly foreclose giving up Stochastic Dominance—we are
facing paradoxes, so some plausible principles will have to go—but I do
not think this is a very promising direction. In what follows, I will take
Stochastic Dominance for granted.
Now we can sum up the argument I just outlined.
Theorem 2. If all that matters is the number of happy lives, Stochastic Dominance
and Separability are jointly inconsistent.
zero—but the prospect of sparing a child from malaria if the dart hits that point (and other-
wise nothing) may still be better than the prospect of getting nothing no matter what. But
these two prospects are stochastically equivalent. Perhaps what is best depends on what
features of its outcomes are sure—where in general this can come apart from what is almost
sure—that is, has probability one.
10Note, though, that this is a defense of strict dominance, while Stochastic Dominance as
stated is tantamount to strong dominance. This is one reason why the alternative formula-
tion of stochastic dominance in footnote 7 might be preferred.
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This looks like very bad news for Separability.
Where does this leave Beckstead and Thomas’s argument for Fanaticism?
In theorem 1, I stated a version of their argument which has Separability as
a premise. If Separability is false, that version is unsound. But Beckstead
and Thomas are more cautious. They write:
The argument … is closely related to well-known arguments
from ‘separability’ for totalist views in population ethics (see
Broome 2004). However, the issue for us is not separability in
general—perhaps modest violations of separability would be
acceptable—but the particular dramatic violations to which
timidity leads. (2020, footnote 15 on p. 17)
I’m not sure what they have in mind when they speak of “modest” versus
“dramatic” violations of separability. But it is entirely true that it might turn
out that, while Separability has counterexamples, the cases that Beckstead
and Thomas’s argument relies on are not among them. Still, I think if we
conclude that Separability simply can’t be true in general, we should lose
much of our confidence in the particular judgments as well. That would tell
us that what is better than what really does depend in strange ways on what
is going on in distant space and time. Given a choice between the lotteries
𝑊 and 𝑋, it matters whether you think there is another St. Petersburg pop-
ulation lottery going on in a distant galaxy. This is bizarre—but Stochastic
Dominance tells us that it is true. So our intuitions about separability, while
admittedly strong, are not to be trusted.
Is there a more restricted principle than Separability which has better hope
of being true, and which still can underwrite Beckstead and Thomas’s ar-
gument? Here is something to try. A simple prospect is one that has only
finitely many possible outcomes.
Simple Separability. For any simple prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , and 𝐴, 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff
𝑋 + 𝐴 ≻ 𝑌 + 𝐴.
This very restricted principle is consistent with Stochastic Dominance. And
Simple Separability can do the same work as Separability in Beckstead and
Thomas’s argument.
But is it true? It might be, but it is hard to be confident of this. What would
the motivation be for it that is not also motivation for the unrestricted prin-
ciple? It can’t be simply the idea that if what is going on in distant space
and time is the same for both of two options, then it is irrelevant to which is
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better. That idea supports full-fledged Separability. So is there something
special about simple prospects that makes their value insensitive to what is
going on in distant space and time? I leave this question open.
There is one other possible response: perhaps the idealizing assumption
that the number of happy lives is all that matters is not an innocent sim-
plification. Both theorem 1 and theorem 2 rely on the drastic idealization
that lives can be freely rearranged between near and far galaxies without
affecting anything of value—for instance, there are no morally important
relationships between people in the same galaxy. Could this be where we
went wrong? This would not save Beckstead and Thomas’s argument, but
it might allow us to salvage Separability.
In fact, both arguments can be generalized to avoid relying on this drastic
idealization. I have talked about adding up numbers of happy lives—but
all the arguments really require is a much more general sense in which out-
comes can be “added up.” The key idea is that each finite outcome can be
split up into two parts: a near part, concerningwhat is going on around here
in the part of the world wemight make any difference to, and a far part, con-
cerning what is going on in Beckstead and Thomas’s “distant galaxy.” We
can “add up” a near outcome 𝑥 and a far outcome 𝑦 to get a combined out-
come which we’ll call 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦. We can similarly talk about near prospects and
far prospects, which can be “added up” outcome by outcome.
Separability can be restated in these more general terms.11
Separability. For any near prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 , and any far prospect 𝐴,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 ⊕ 𝐴 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐴
For any far prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 , and any near prospect 𝐴,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝐴 ⊕ 𝑋 ≻ 𝐴 ⊕ 𝑌
The strong idealizing assumption that all that matters is the number of
happy lives can then be replacedwithmuchweaker structural assumptions
about adding up outcomes. If all that matters is the number of happy lives,
then we can freely rearrange happy lives between the near and far parts
of the world without losing any value: an outcome with 𝑚 happy lives
nearby and 𝑛 happy lives far away is just as good as an outcome with zero
11We have added a second clause because our new notion of “adding up” outcomes or
prospects need not be commutative.
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happy lives nearby and 𝑚 + 𝑛 happy lives far away. In our more general
setting, the key principle is that we can always compensate somehow for
making things worse nearby, by making things sufficiently better far away
(and vice versa). We will call this assumption (Positive) Compensation; it is
stated precisely in appendix A.
We could also restate the other premise of Beckstead and Thomas’s argu-
ment, More is Better, in these more general terms. But if we help ourselves
to the stronger assumption of Stochastic Dominance, we can avoid some
complications in the general statement of the theorem and also give a sub-
stantially simpler proof.
Theorem 3. Stochastic Dominance, Simple Separability, and Positive Compensa-
tion together imply Fanaticism.
This generalization of theorem 1 does not provide a new way of defending
Beckstead and Thomas’s argument for Fanaticism: for we can also general-
ize theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Stochastic Dominance, Separability, and Positive Compensation are
jointly inconsistent.
(Proofs are given in appendix A.)
So to argue for Fanaticism on the basis of theorem 3, we would again have
to find a way to motivate Simple Separability without going all the way to
full-fledged Separability.
But the generalization also clarifies how full-fledged Separabilitymight still
be true after all: it might be Compensation that fails, instead. There is—of
necessity—more that matters morally than just the total number of happy
lives; lives can not be freely rearranged without any effect on value.
Note that, unlike Stochastic Dominance or Separability, Compensation is
not a principle about risk, but purely about what ways for the world to be
are best. Giving up Compensation imposes constraints on axiology. Reject-
ing Compensation will be strange—but theorem 4 ensures that every consis-
tent view is strange. One way of developing this idea is to say that eventu-
ally the value of a galaxy is “saturated,” so no further vast improvements
are possible—and in particular, no further improvements would suffice to
make up for a large loss of value in another galaxy. Adding more happy
lives to a galaxy far away that already contains some huge number of happy
lives simply cannot make up for eliminating many happy lives nearby.
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Here is a simple model. “Near” value and “far” value are represented by
two bounded utility functions. The total utility of an outcome is given by
the sum of its near utility and its far utility, and the best prospect is that
which maximizes expected utility. In this model, if “far utility” is already
close to its upper bound, there will be no way of improving it enough to
compensate for a large loss in “near utility.” This model satisfies Stochastic
Dominance and Separability, but not Compensation. Fanaticism also fails
in this model: since total utility is bounded, there are no goods immense
enough to warrant extremely long-odds gambles.
It turns out that every natural model is going to work out in basically the
same way. It is possible to show that Stochastic Dominance and Separabil-
ity, together with a few other auxiliary assumptions, imply that Fanaticism
is false. But the precise statement and proof of this result are a bit more
complicated than the others in this essay, so I will omit it.
Where does this leave us? (I’ll hold Stochastic Dominance and the order
axioms fixed.) We find ourselves in an unstable dialectical situation. The
basic idea, remember, was that the value of a prospect shouldn’t depend in
strange ways on distant space and time: if two prospects are exactly alike
in terms of the probabilities they assign to distant goings-on, then it seems
we should be able to “subtract” the distant part and compare the prospects
just based on what they say about the part of the world where the choice be-
tween them might conceivably make a difference. What we have found is
that a restricted version of this idea—Simple Separability—together with the
“value rearrangement” Compensation principle, implies that Fanaticism is
true. But Separability in general is inconsistent with Compensation, and in
fact (with other auxiliary assumptions, I have claimed) it implies that Fa-
naticism is false.
3 The Indology argument
Wilkinson (forthcoming) gives another argument for Fanaticism which is
closely related to Beckstead and Thomas’s. This argument is the last of three
inWilkinson’s rich paper, and the one thatWilkinson reckons themost com-
pelling (p. 6). (My presentation generalize Wilkinson’s.)12
12Wilkinson’s presentation presupposes totalism, which allows him to state Background
Independence in terms adding the (cardinal) values of outcomes together—understood as real
numbers. I am generalizing his argument to a more axiologically neutral setting.
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This argument also has three steps. Once again, we will consider outcomes
that can be split into two parts, which we’ll call “near” and “far.”
Step 1. Consider a differentway or restricting Separability, wherewe require
that the “background” prospect involves no uncertainty.
Background Independence. For any near prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 and any far
outcome 𝑎,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑎 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝑎
Say 𝑎 is an outcomewhere there are amillion happy lives, far away and long
ago. Then 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑎 is a prospect that is sure to result in a million additional
happy lives (far away) besides what results from 𝑋 (around here). Back-
ground Independence is the basis for the classic “Egyptology” objection to
the average view in population ethics (McMahan 1981, 115; Parfit 1984, 420).
It would be very strange if, when choosing between two policies, our deci-
sion might turn on whether an additional million people thrived in ancient
Egypt utterly unaffected by our choice.
Wemight worry about whether this principle is true, for the kind of reasons
discussed in the previous section. But at least it does not give rise to the
exact same kind of problems as the general Separability principle. Since the
background outcome 𝑎 does not build in any uncertainty of its own, there is
no worry about this interacting with 𝑋 and 𝑌 in different ways in different
states, which might compensate for 𝑌 ’s bad cases without compensating
for 𝑋’s bad cases.13
Step 2. Wilkinson gives a different argument for a kind of separability fail-
ure, based on Tarsney (2020). Suppose Fanaticism is false. Then it can be
shown that there is a risky lottery 𝑋 and a safe lottery 𝑌 such that 𝑋 ⊁ 𝑌 ,
but for some background prospect 𝐵, which is independent of both 𝑋 and 𝑌 ,
𝑋 ⊕ 𝐵 stochastically dominates 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐵. Then Stochastic Dominance tells
us:
𝑋 ⊕ 𝐵 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐵
Instead of imagining extra lives in ancient Egypt, Wilkinson imagines the
background prospect concerning what went on in the ancient Indus valley,
about which we have a great deal of uncertainty.
13Furthermore, unlike Separability, Background Independence is consistent with Stochas-
tic Dominance, even if only the numbers matter. Thanks to Zach Goodsell for discussion.
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We happen to know even less about what happened in the
ancient Indus Valley than in ancient Egypt—archaeological
research and excavations of key sites in India began centuries
later than similar work in Britain, Italy, and Egypt. So there is
likely plenty left to learn in Indology. (Wilkinson, forthcoming,
26)
Step 3. Now consider how things might go once we remove this uncertainty.
The effect would be to replace the uncertain prospect 𝐵 with some particu-
lar outcome 𝑏. But since 𝑋 ⊁ 𝑌 , Background Independence tells us
𝑋 ⊕ 𝑏 ⊁ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝑏
This is strange!
From Background Independence we know that, whatever you
might uncover in your research, you would conclude that the
risky lottery is no better than the safe lottery. … So you know
what judgement you would make if you simply learned more,
no matter what it is you would actually learn. So why do the
many years of research?
… Surely we can sidestep those years of research into how 𝐵
turns out, and make the judgement required by every possible
value of 𝑏. Surely rationality requires that we do so, rather than
require that we do not. But, if we deny Fanaticism, we must
accept this inconsistency — an inconsistency which, to me,
seems far more absurd than simply accepting Fanaticism and
even more absurd than the Egyptology Objection (Wilkinson,
forthcoming, 27–28)
I take it that Wilkinson’s judgment here is based on the following principle.
Negative Reflection. For prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 and a question 𝑄, if 𝑋 is not
better than 𝑌 conditional on any possible answer to 𝑄, then 𝑋 is not
better than 𝑌 unconditionally.14
This is a kind of “no regret” principle (compareArntzenius 2008; see Russell
and Isaacs 2020, sec. 2, and references therein). If Negative Reflection is
14Wemodel a question as a regular partition, a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive events each of which has positive probability. (Following Tarsney, Wilkinson’s original
way of running the argument used a continuous distribution 𝐵, but we can just as well use
a discrete distribution for simplicity.)
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violated, then youmay choose the better prospect, go on to do your research,
and then find that your chosen option isn’t better after all—no matter what
your research turns up. That does seem weird.15
As with Beckstead and Thomas’s argument, Wilkinson’s argument can
be summarized by a theorem. Before I state it in general terms, there is
one structural point to explain. An important feature of the background
prospect𝐵 that figures in the Indology argument is that it has “heavy tails,”
allocating substantial probability to very good outcomes, and also to very
bad possible outcomes. The results in section 2 only relied on very good
outcomes; Positive Compensation ensured that there were sufficiently
good outcomes around. For the Indology argument we additionally need
a Negative Compensation principle, which ensures that are sufficiently bad
outcomes. It is spelled out in appendix A.16
Here is the generalization of Wilkinson’s main result.
Theorem 5. Stochastic Dominance, Negative Reflection, Background Indepen-
dence, and Positive and Negative Compensation together imply Fanaticism.
These four principles seem very plausible, and the Indology argument
seems very strong. But there are two problems with it—one big, and one
smaller.
Here is the big problem:
Theorem 6. Stochastic Dominance and Negative Reflection together imply that
Fanaticism is false.
This tells us that the premises of the Indology argument—which include
Stochastic Dominance and Negative Reflection—are in fact jointly inconsis-
tent, and so the argument cannot be sound.
Here is the basic idea behind theorem 6. (Details are again in appendix A.)
First, Fanaticism implies the existence of generalized St. Petersburg prospects
15Negative Reflection is a variant for “not better” of what Russell and Isaacs (2020) call
Countable Independence, andwhich is also called Dominance∗ in other places (for example,
Lee 2013).
16Wilkinson appealed to the stronger principle that composing near and far outcomes
just amounts to adding up real numbers—which follows from his totalist assumptions.
Tarsney’s theorem, which Wilkinson’s argument relies on, uses the technical assumption
that outcomes have additive conjoint structure (see Tarsney 2020, 11; Krantz, Suppes, and
Luce 1971, 245–66). Positive and Negative Compensation both follow from one of the four
axioms that characterize such structures.
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(see Beckstead and Thomas 2020, sec. 4). We can find a sequence of out-
comes that get better very fast, and use these to construct a prospect which
is strictly better than any of its outcomes; Russell and Isaacs (2020) call such
prospects improper. The existence of improper prospects is a particularly
unsettling consequence of Fanaticism.
Second, improper prospects violate Negative Reflection.17 We can play two
generalized St. Petersburg games 𝑋 and 𝑌 , independently. We can choose
𝑌 so its outcomes are a little better than 𝑋’s—and so 𝑌 stochastically dom-
inates 𝑋—but still, none of 𝑌 ’s outcomes are as good as the prospect 𝑋.
Conditional on any way 𝑌 could turn out, 𝑌 is only as good as one of its
mundane outcomes, and so no better than 𝑋. But 𝑌 is unconditionally bet-
ter than 𝑋, contradicting Negative Reflection.
There is also a second, less serious problem for the Indology argument.
Many people hold that some outcomes are incomparable to one another: nei-
ther is strictly better than the other, but they are still not equally good (for
instance, Chang 2002). Is it better to experience a profoundlymoving impro-
vised one-person show, or to take a meditative three-day wilderness hike in
the Sierra Nevada? Neither seems clearly better than the other. One way of
arguing that they are also not equally good is that sweetening either option,
say by throwing in a free sticker, still does not make one option seem better
than the other.
But the combination of Stochastic Dominance andNegative Reflection rules
out such cases (see Hare 2010; Schoenfield 2014; Bales, Cohen, and Hand-
field 2014; Bader 2018). The argument is based on so-called “opaque sweet-
ening” (see table 5). You flip a coin: Heads, you take the hike; Tails, the
show. Call this prospect 𝑋. Then consider a “sweetened” prospect 𝑌 :
Heads, you take the hike and get a sticker; Tails you do the show. The
sweetened option 𝑌 dominates 𝑋, so 𝑌 is better than 𝑋. But then you
think, what’s so special about Heads? Consider the prospect 𝑋′: Heads,
you go to the show; Tails, you take a hike. Then𝑋 and𝑋′ are stochastically
equivalent—so equally good. In short, 𝑌 stochastically dominates 𝑋′—so 𝑌
is better than 𝑋′. Finally, though, by assumption 𝑌 is not better than 𝑋′
given Heads, nor is it better given Tails. So Negative Reflection implies that
𝑌 is not better than 𝑋′. We have a contradiction.18
17The analogous point for Positive Reflection (below) was one of the lessons of the two-
envelope paradox (see Broome 1995; Chalmers 2002).
18Note also that this argument does not turn on the infinite partitions that figure in both
theorem 5 and theorem 6.
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Table 5: 𝑌 dominates𝑋,𝑋 is stochastically equivalent to𝑋′,
but by Negative Reflection, 𝑌 is not better than 𝑋′.
Heads Tails
𝑋 Hike Show
𝑌 Hike + Sticker Show
𝑋′ Show Hike
So the second, smaller problem for the Indology argument is that two of
its premises—Stochastic Dominance andNegative Reflection—are inconsis-
tent with incomparability between outcomes.
This consequence is especially pressing in the context of an argument for
Fanaticism: for Fanaticism provides special reasons to suspect that some
prospects are incomparable to one another—even in a context where all pos-
sible outcomes are totally ordered; but a very similar argument from Neg-
ative Reflection rules this out as well.19 Lauwers (2016) shows that if out-
comes are represented by unbounded real-valued utilities, then there is no
constructible total ordering of prospects that obeys an independence axiom
(similar to the Sure Thing Principle, discussed below). We could never hope
to write down a decision theory, extending the standard theory of expected
value, that told us how to rank every pair of prospects—the existence of
such orders in platonic heaven depends on the Axiom of Choice.20
Despite this, my preferred response to the “opaque sweetening” argu-
ment is to reject incomparability (for defense see Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl,
Manuscript)—but I do not wish to take this controversial view for granted
in this essay. Others have wielded this as an argument against Stochastic
Equivalence (Schoenfield 2014; Bales, Cohen, and Handfield 2014). A more
standard view gives up Negative Reflection (for example, Aumann 1962;
see also Bader 2018).
In contrast, consider the analogous principle for at least as good rather than
not better:
19The generalized argument requires an additional premise: the Sure Thing Principle (be-
low) suffices.
20Another consideration is that Askell (2018) shows that for infinite populations, no total
ordering of outcomes is compatible with both the principle that what is better for everyone
is better overall, and the principle that betterness is invariant under arbitrary permutations
of welfare.
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Positive Reflection. For prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 and a question 𝑄, if 𝑋 is at
least as good as 𝑌 conditional on any possible answer to 𝑄, then 𝑋 is
at least as good as 𝑌 unconditionally.
Unlike Negative Reflection, Positive Reflection is perfectly compatible with
incomparability (whether between outcomes or prospects). But Positive Re-
flection still does rule out Fanaticism, given Stochastic Dominance. The ar-
gument is essentially the same as for theorem 6.
To sum up, not only do Reflection principles fail to support Fanaticism, but
in fact they undermine it.
Still, I agree with Wilkinson that Reflection principles have much to be said
in their favor. One argument is based on the value of information.21 Suppose
you have two basic options—Take It or Leave It. Then consider a third option:
Take It If the Taking Is Good. That is, you can commit to Taking It only if, given
the additional information of how many people there are in the universe,
Taking It turns out to be as good as Leaving It. This third option seems like
it should be at least as good as either of the other two. It amounts to doing
what is best given more information, rather than less—and how could this
be bad? Betterness-for-prospects is supposed to be a guide to outcomes
that really are better, given all the information about how things turn out.
Betterness-given-more-information should be as good or better a guide than
betterness-given-less-information. As Broome (1991, 129) puts it:
[P]robabilities derived frommore information have a higher sta-
tus than those derived from less. …At the extreme, what would
actually happen has the highest status of all. … This at least is
true: you ought not to found your judgements on lower-status
probabilities when higher-status probabilities are available.
But if Positive Reflection fails, then it can turn out that Taking It If the Taking
Is Good is not as good as just Leaving It. For if Positive Reflection fails, then
it could be that Take It is as good as Leave It given any number of people—
and so Take It If the Taking Is Good simply amounts to the same thing as Take
It—and yet Take It is not as good as Leave It. This seems absurd.
21This is based on one of several arguments Russell and Isaacs (2020) give in defense of
Positive Reflection, generalizing standard arguments for orthodox expectational decision
theory in finite cases. Their arguments are about rational preference, but they can be easily
adapted to arguments about which prospects are morally best. Note that while this argu-
ment is structurally related to standard dynamic consistency arguments, it is not an argument
about sequential decision-making through time.
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Such arguments for Positive Reflection amount to arguments against Fanati-
cism. Indeed, Positive Reflection, together with other standard axioms of
decision theory, presses us to a specific kind of anti-fanatical view: expected
utility maximization with a bounded utility function (see Hammond 1998;
for a generalization see Russell 2020). This kind of theory keeps Stochastic
Dominance and both Positive and Negative Reflection. Which of the other
two propositions in the inconsistent tetrad we keep—Background Indepen-
dence or Compensation—depends on howwe fill in details. As in section 2,
we could let the utility of an outcome 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦 be given as the sum of two
bounded utility functions 𝑢1(𝑥) + 𝑢2(𝑦)—one “near” and one “far.” This
version satisfies Background Independence (and indeed Separability), but
not Compensation. The alternative is to use a utility function that is not ad-
ditively separable in this way: for example, instead of taking a sum of two
bounded functions, we could use a bounded function of the sum of the two
parts—if we have functions 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 that represent near and far outcomes
with numbers, respectively, then the utility would be 𝑢(𝑓1(𝑥) + 𝑓2(𝑦)) for
some bounded function 𝑢. This kind of model keeps Compensation, while
giving up Background Independence.
But even though Reflection principles have much in their favor, we
should not be too hasty to accept them, along with their anti-Fanatical
consequences. For these consequences are also very strange.
As in section 2, we should ask whether we can repair Wilkinson’s Indology
argument by substituting some more restricted reflection principle that can
do the same work. Here is something to try.22
The Sure Thing Principle. If 𝐸 has positive probability and prospects 𝑋
and 𝑌 are equally good conditional on not-𝐸, then 𝑋 is at least as
good as 𝑌 conditional on 𝐸 iff 𝑋 is at least as good as 𝑌 uncondition-
ally.
This principle can be motivated by very similar reflection considerations.23
Say you are again choosing between Take It or Leave It. And you are about
to learn whether it’s Hot or Cold. Suppose that, given Hot, Take It is at least
as good as Leave It; and given Cold, Take It is just as good as Leave It. Then
22There are several non-equivalent principles that are called “The Sure Thing Principle”—
see Schlee (1997). But I think this is one reasonable candidate for that label. In Savage’s
framework probabilities are not given; we can replace the condition that 𝐸 has positive
probability with the condition that 𝐸 is “non-null” in the sense that some prospects that
agree on ¬𝐸 are not equally good.
23Indeed, this is how Savage (1954, sec. 2.7) motivated it.
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whatever you learn, you will conclude that Take It is at least as good as
Leave It. So it seems you ought to be able to conclude in advance that Take
It is at least as good as Leave It—this is the same kind of reasoning as in
Wilkinson’s Indology story. Similar reasoning supports the converse direc-
tion of the Sure Thing Principle as well.
The Sure Thing Principle is somewhat controversial (more so than Stochas-
tic Dominance). Theories that allow risk aversion violate it (Quiggin 1993;
Buchak 2013); theories that tell us to ignore small-probability outcomes do
as well.24 But, while it is in the same spirit as Positive and Negative Reflec-
tion, it is much less demanding. Repeated applications of the Sure Thing
Principle can tell us that if one option is better than another conditional on
each event in a finite partition, then it is better unconditionally. But Posi-
tive and Negative Reflection apply even to infinite partitions—and on these
the Sure Thing Principle is silent. Unlike the infinitary principles, the Sure
Thing Principle is consistent with Fanaticism. It is also consistent with in-
comparable prospects.
Can the Sure Thing Principle, together with Background Independence,
serve as the basis for a new “Egyptology” style argument for Fanaticism?
Not in the same way as in Wilkinson’s Indology argument, no. The
background prospect 𝐵 that figures in Tarsney’s construction, which
Wilkinson’s argument is based on, has infinitely many possible outcomes—
recall its “heavy tails.” (See appendix A for more explanation.) But we
can give a different argument. The Sure Thing Principle restricts the
space of possible decision theories quite a bit. Meanwhile, Background
Independence restricts the space of possible axiologies quite a bit. Together,
these squeeze us toward Fanaticism.
I noted earlier that the Indology argument relies on bad outcomes, in a way
that the Separability arguments in section 2 did not. We can show that the
argument would not work without them, with a model. Suppose that all
that matters is the number of happy lives. Then we can construct an ex-
pected utility model with a bounded utility function (which takes values
between −1 and 0):
𝑈(𝑛) = −2−𝑛
24Suppose 𝐸 is an event with positive but negligibly small probability. Let 𝑋 and 𝑌
be prospects that always have the same outcome, except in 𝐸, in which case 𝑌 is sure to
turn out strictly better than 𝑋. Then theories that neglect negligibly small probabilities will
say that 𝑋 and 𝑌 are equally good unconditionally—so 𝑋 ≿ 𝑌 . But while 𝑋 and 𝑌 are
equally good conditional on not-𝐸, 𝑋 is not at least as good as 𝑌 conditional on 𝐸.
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This is a theory according to which additional happy people have diminish-
ing marginal utility. Any bounded expected utility model satisfies Stochas-
tic Dominance and both Positive and Negative Reflection (see Hammond
1998). Moreover, this utility function has the nice feature that, for a prospect
𝑋,
𝐸𝑈(𝑋 + 𝑛) = 2−𝑛 ⋅ 𝐸𝑈(𝑋)
This is an order-preserving transformation of 𝐸𝑈(𝑋), which guarantees
Background Independence. Since the utility function is bounded, this
model does not satisfy Fanaticism.
Butwe cannot simply extend this utility function down to negative numbers
representing unhappy lives. Note that𝑈(𝑛) bends downward: for instance,
𝑈(1) > 12𝑈(0) +
1
2𝑈(2)
This means that in this model, getting the one happy life for sure is bet-
ter than flipping a coin to decide whether you get zero or two. In other
words, the model endorses risk aversion with respect to happy lives. But
Background Independence tells us that we can “shift” this risk-averse pref-
erence down, by adding any negative value to each of the outcomes. So we
must also have, for example,
𝑈(0) > 12𝑈(−1) +
1
2𝑈(1)
(See figure 1.) In fact, the utility function must continue to bend downward
no matter how far you go to the left. This means that its extension to neg-
ative values must be unbounded below—which results in Negative Fanati-
cism, where an arbitrarily small risk of a very bad outcome is worse than a
certain outcome which is still quite bad.
This idea generalizes. As it turns out, the general argument needs onemore
premise. As I noted earlier, we have not generally assumed that prospects
are comparable: there may be prospects such that neither is better than the
other, and yet they are not equally good. For the present argument we still
do not need to assume comparability in general—but we do require some
especially simple value comparisons.
Simple Comparability. If 𝑥 is a good outcome and 𝑦 is a bad outcome, then
a fair lottery with outcomes 𝑥 or 𝑦 is good, bad, or neutral.


















Figure 1: If 𝑈 is concave for positive values, Background Independence
requires that𝑈 is also concave for negative values, which leads to Negative
Fanaticism.
Theorem 7. The Sure Thing Principle, Stochastic Dominance, Background In-
dependence, Positive and Negative Compensation, and Simple Comparability to-
gether imply that at least one of Positive Fanaticism or Negative Fanaticism is
true.
A proof is given in appendix A.
What arewe tomake of this? Once again, the dialectical situation is unstable.
A strong reflection principle implies that Fanaticism is false. But a weak re-
flection principle—the Sure Thing Principle—together with Background In-
dependence (and some auxiliary principles) implies that Fanaticism is true.
Facing both opposing arguments, I do not think we should place our trust
in either yet. Whatever the truth, it is very strange, and we are still far from
understanding it.
What are our options? (In order to keep this list under control, I will hold
Stochastic Dominance and the order axioms fixed.)
1. Accept at least one of Positive or Negative Reflection, and thereby re-
ject Fanaticism. Then we must also give up one of Background Inde-
pendence or Compensation; things are strange either way. If Back-
ground Independence fails, then we have even stranger dependence
on distant space and time than before—since now even if we know
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precisely what is going on out there, it still can make a difference to
what prospects for nearby matters are best. If Compensation fails,
then the universe canmysteriously run out of room formore value (or
disvalue), and rearranging populations between near and far parts of
the world can make a moral difference.
2. Reject Positive and Negative Reflection, but keep the Sure Thing Prin-
ciple. This is strange, first because it seems unprincipled, when the
arguments in support of each are so similar—including arguments
based on regret or the value of information. Second, because again
we must either reject Background Independence or Compensation, or
else accept Fanaticism—each of which is strange.
3. Reject Reflection and the Sure Thing Principle, perhaps going for some
less standard decision theory (such as risk-weighting or discounting
small probabilities). This allows for regret and negative value of infor-
mation even in simple cases.25 Fanaticism remains an open question.
4. Give up Simple Comparability. This might sound desperate—but
Tarsney (2020) defends the austere view that Stochastic Dominance
is the only normative principle of decision theory. This theory allows
rampant incomparability between prospects. Combined with a suit-
able axiology, it satisfies all of the premises of theorem 7 except Simple
Comparability, while upholding neither Positive nor Negative Fanati-
cism. (Note, incidentally, that it also does not satisfy Separability.)
However, it must be noted that Tarsney’s rejection of Fanaticism is
half-hearted. While extremely risky gambles are not deemed better
than safe options, neither are they deemedworse: accepting a fanatical
wager and rejecting it are also incomparable prospects, in this theory.
4 Taking stock
One of the main routes to Fanaticism is via expectational total utilitarian-
ism (what Bostrom called “standard utilitarianism”). One of the attractions
of that package is that it seems to make for a very elegant moral universe.
You can have clean principles like Separability and the Sure Thing Princi-
ple, and there are powerful theorems about how such principles constrain
mathematical representations of betterness (see Broome 2004). The theory
does make some counterintuitive predictions, but these may be worth tak-
25See also Briggs (2015)
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ing in stride, since the theory is so tidy and principled … in simple cases
where there are only finitely many different states of nature, and there are
at most finitely many people.
But as soon as you consider prospects with infinitely many states and un-
bounded populations, everything comes apart. In this general setting we
find that expectational totalism is a radically incomplete theory (see Hájek
andNover 2008; Lauwers 2017). There is noway of extending expectational
totalism to infinite cases with the same elegance that we are used to from fi-
nite cases. Elegant principles must be given up, including Separability and
Reflection.
Expectational totalism does still seem to be a consistent live option, and
with it Fanaticism. It satisfies modified and truncated versions of the origi-
nal elegant principles. But the modifications and truncations seem like they
might be telling us that there is something wrong about the underlying
ideas. Arguments for Fanaticism based on these modified and truncated
principles don’t have nearly the same immediate grip as the ones involv-
ing the sweeping clean versions. So even though the Fanatical position is
still there, it no longer stands out as the bold, austere, and systematic ethical
framework that it once seemed.
Furthermore, what Fanaticism has lost in elegance, anti-Fanatical theories
have gained. For in fact, we can have sweeping, clean principles like Sepa-
rability or Reflection, as long as we give up Fanaticism, along with some of
the premises that got us there.
Here are three broad versions of this. One approach keeps both Reflection
and Separability, while cutting our axiology down to size by giving upCom-
pensation. A second keepsReflection andCompensation, and gives up both
Separability and Background Independence. Both of these two approaches
can be represented using standard expected utility theory with bounded
utilities; they only differ in the structure of their utility functions. (In the
first case only, the utility function is additively separable.) A third elegant
vision is Tarsney’s theory, which keeps most of these principles (though not
Separability) by giving up many comparisons of value.
All of these options are strange. I don’t know which is true, and I think it is
premature to be confident in any of them.
The paradoxes of large values and small probabilities are deeply weird. But
they aren’t outlandish. In our actual situation, I take it that there are in-
finitely many live possibilities for what our universe is like, and we should
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assign significant probability to very good and very bad outcomes. Our
own species might thrive for a very long time, and for all we know there
may be many others in the universe. These paradoxes are not just brain-
teasers that can be ignoredwhenwe are doing serious practical ethics—they
raise difficult questions that we must answer, if we are to do as much good
as we can.
A Theorems and Proofs
First, the background technical framework. There is a set of states equipped
with a 𝜎-algebra of events, and and a set of (finite) outcomes. A prospect is
a measurable function from states to outcomes. (We will focus on discrete
prospects.) We fix in the background some probability measure 𝑃 on states;
we assume this is suitably rich (e.g., non-atomic). There is a relation ≿ (at
least as good) that holds between prospects; this is assumed to be transitive
and reflexive. Strict betterness ≻ and indifference ∼ are defined in terms of
≿ in the usual way. We will generally treat outcomes interchangeably with
their corresponding constant prospects.
For convenience of exposition, we take as fixed some baseline “zero” out-
come 0. Outcomes better than this are good or gains, and outcomes worse
than this are bad or losses; outcomes exactly as good as the baseline are neu-
tral. We take for granted that there is at least one good outcome. For an
outcome 𝑥, we let 𝑝 ∗ 𝑥 stand for an arbitrary prospect with probability 𝑝
of outcome 𝑥 and probability 1 − 𝑝 of the outcome 0.
(Positive) Fanaticism. For any probability 𝑝 > 0 and any finite outcome
𝑥 ≻ 0, there is a finite outcome 𝑦 such that 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ≻ 𝑥.
That is to say, any prospect which has probability 𝑝 of outcome 𝑦 and prob-
ability 1 − 𝑝 of 0 is strictly better than the constant prospect which has
outcome 𝑥 in every state.
Negative Fanaticism. For any probability 𝑝 > 0 and any finite outcome
𝑥 ≺ 0, there is a finite outcome 𝑦 such that 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ≺ 𝑥.
There is also a set of near outcomes and a set of far outcomes. Each finite
outcome has a near component and a far component. It will simplify our
reasoning if we suppose that near and far outcomes are freely recombinable:
for each near outcome𝑥 and far outcome 𝑦, there is a combined outcome𝑥⊕
𝑦 with those components. (This assumption could be weakened.) Without
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too much risk of confusion, we also use the notation 0 for the near and far
components of the baseline outcome, so 0 = 0 ⊕ 0.
Near/far prospects are measurable functions from states to near/far out-
comes. For a near prospect𝑋 and a far prospect𝐴, we define the combined
prospect statewise:
(𝑋 ⊕ 𝐴)(𝑠) = 𝑋(𝑠) ⊕ 𝐴(𝑠)
If 𝑋 and 𝑌 are near prospects, let 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 abbreviate 𝑋 ⊕ 0 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 0, and
analogously for far prospects.
We will restate the principles that figure in the following theorems for easy
reference.
Stochastic Dominance. Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 be prospects. If for every outcome 𝑥,
𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] ≤ 𝑃 [𝑌 ≿ 𝑥]
then 𝑋 ≾ 𝑌 . If, furthermore, for some outcome 𝑥,
𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥] < 𝑃 [𝑌 ≿ 𝑥]
then 𝑋 ≺ 𝑌 .
Separability. For any near prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 , and any far prospect 𝐴,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 ⊕ 𝐴 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐴
For any far prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 , and any near prospect 𝐴,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝐴 ⊕ 𝑋 ≻ 𝐴 ⊕ 𝑌
Simple Separability. For any simple prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , and 𝐴, 𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff
𝑋 + 𝐴 ≻ 𝑌 + 𝐴.
It is also useful to distinguish this special case:
Outcome Separability. For any near outcomes 𝑥 and 𝑦 and any far out-
come 𝑎,
𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 iff 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑎 ≺ 𝑦 ⊕ 𝑎
For any far outcomes 𝑥 and 𝑦 and any near outcome 𝑎,
𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 iff 𝑎 ⊕ 𝑥 ≺ 𝑎 ⊕ 𝑦
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(Positive) Compensation. For any near good 𝑥 and far good 𝑦, there is a
far good 𝑧 such that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦 ∼ 0 ⊕ 𝑧, and there is a near good 𝑤 such
that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦 ∼ 𝑤 ⊕ 0.
Even if we zero out all of the near value, we can offset this by improving
things enough in a distant galaxy.
Say that a sequence of near outcomes 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … form an arithmetic progres-
sion, with difference 𝑧 (which is a far good), iff
𝑥𝑛 ⊕ 𝑧 ∼ 𝑥𝑛+1 ⊕ 0 for each 𝑛
Positive Compensation implies that for any near good 𝑥1 and any far good
𝑧, 𝑥1 is the start of an infinite arithmetic progression with difference 𝑧. Fur-
thermore, Outcome Separability implies that 𝑥1 ≺ 𝑥2 ≺ ⋯. We can say
the same things about arithmetic progressions of far goods, where the dif-
ference is a near good.
Theorem 3. Stochastic Dominance, Simple Separability, and Positive Compensa-
tion together imply Fanaticism.
We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 1. Positive Compensation and Outcome Separability imply that, for any
near good 𝑥 and any probability 𝑝 > 0, there is a near good 𝑦, a prospect 𝑌 = 𝑝∗𝑦,
and a simple prospect 𝐴 such that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝐴 is stochastically dominated by 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐴.
This lemma suffices for theorem 3: Stochastic Dominance ensures that 𝑥 ⊕
𝐴 ≺ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐴, and then by Simple Separability 𝑥 ≺ 𝑌 , QED.
Proof of lemma 1. Assume 𝑝 < 1. Consider a partition of 𝑛 + 1 events: the
first has probability 𝑝, and the rest each have probability 𝑞 = (1 − 𝑝)/𝑛,
with 𝑛 chosen to be large enough so that 𝑞 < 𝑝.
By Positive Compensation, we can let 0, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛 be an arithmetic pro-
gression of far goods with difference 𝑥: that is, for each 𝑘,
𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧𝑘 ∼ 0 ⊕ 𝑧𝑘+1
We can also choose a near good 𝑦 such that
𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧𝑛 ∼ 𝑦 ⊕ 0
By Outcome Separability,
𝑥 ⊕ 0 ≺ 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧1 ≺ 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧2 ≺ ⋯ ≺ 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧𝑛 ∼ 𝑦 ⊕ 0
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Then we construct prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , and 𝐴 as in table 6: 𝑋 is sure to have
outcome 𝑥, 𝑌 is a gamble with chance 𝑝 of 𝑦, and 𝐴 yields nothing if 𝑦
pays off, and otherwise yields the result of a fair lottery between each of the
outcomes 𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛.
Table 6: A simpler Separability argument, using Stochastic
Dominance.
𝑝 𝑞 𝑞 ⋯ 𝑞
𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 𝑥 ⋯ 𝑥
𝑌 𝑦 0 0 ⋯ 0
𝐴 0 𝑧1 𝑧2 ⋯ 𝑧𝑛
It can be checked that 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐴 stochastically dominates 𝑥 ⊕ 𝐴.
Theorem 4. Stochastic Dominance, Separability, and Positive Compensation are
jointly inconsistent.
Proof. First a basic fact: for each outcome 𝑥 ⊕ 0, there is some strictly better
outcome 𝑦⊕0 (and similarly for far outcomes). We have assumed that there
is some good outcome; by Positive Compensation some outcome 0 ⊕ 𝑧 is
good. Then Positive Compensation and Outcome Separability tell us that
there is some 𝑦 ⊕ 0 ∼ 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧 ≻ 𝑥 ⊕ 0.
Nowwe recursively construct two sequences of finite goods as follows. For
the base case, let 𝑥0 ⊕ 𝑦0 = 0 ⊕ 0. For the recursive step, for each 𝑛, we can
find 𝑤𝑛 and 𝑧𝑛 such that
𝑥𝑛−1 ⊕ 0 ≺ 𝑧𝑛 ⊕ 0
0 ⊕ 𝑦𝑛−1 ≺ 0 ⊕ 𝑤𝑛
By Compensation we can then find 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑦𝑛 such that
𝑤𝑛 ⊕ 𝑧𝑛 ∼ 0 ⊕ 𝑦𝑛
𝑤𝑛 ⊕ 𝑧𝑛 ∼ 𝑥𝑛 ⊕ 0
Next, we will use these outcomes to construct four prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , 𝑊, 𝑍
as in table 7. Choose events 𝐸1, 𝐸2, … and 𝐹1, 𝐹2, …, where 𝑃(𝐸𝑛) =
𝑃(𝐹𝑛) = 2−(𝑛+1) (just as in section 2).
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Table 7: The generalized counterexample to Separability.
𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 ⋯ 𝐹1 𝐹2 𝐹3 ⋯
𝑋 0 0 0 ⋯ 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 ⋯
𝑌 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 ⋯ 0 0 0 ⋯
𝑊 𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3 ⋯ 𝑤1 𝑤2 𝑤3 ⋯
𝑍 𝑧1 𝑧2 𝑧3 ⋯ 𝑧1 𝑧2 𝑧3 ⋯
By construction, 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌 is equally good as 𝑊 ⊕ 𝑍 in every state. But also,
𝑊 ⊕ 0 stochastically dominates 𝑋 ⊕ 0, and 0 ⊕ 𝑍 stochastically dominates
0 ⊕ 𝑌 . So 𝑋 ⊕ 0 ≺ 𝑊 ⊕ 0 and 0 ⊕ 𝑌 ≺ 0 ⊕ 𝑍, and thus Separability tells
us:
𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌 ≺ 𝑊 ⊕ 𝑌 ≺ 𝑊 ⊕ 𝑍 ∼ 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑌
This cannot be.
Background Independence. For any near prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 and any far
outcome 𝑎,
𝑋 ≻ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑎 ≻ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝑎
We will also consider conditional prospects: if 𝑋 is a prospect and 𝐸 is
an event with positive probability, then 𝑋|𝐸 is the restriction of 𝑋 to 𝐸.
We take the betterness relation to apply to conditional prospects as well.
Stochastic Dominance (and Stochastic Equivalence) will be understood to
also apply to conditional prospects, where 𝑃 [(𝑋|𝐸) ≿ 𝑥] is understood
as the conditional probability 𝑃 [𝑋 ≿ 𝑥 ∣ 𝐸]. Let 𝑋 ≿𝐸 𝑌 mean that
𝑋|𝐸 ≿ 𝑌 |𝐸.
Negative Reflection. For any prospects𝑋 and 𝑌 and any regular partition
ℰ, if 𝑋 ⊁𝐸 𝑌 for each 𝐸 ∈ ℰ, then 𝑋 ⊁ 𝑌 .
Negative Compensation. For any near good 𝑥 and any far outcome 𝑦,
there is a far outcome 𝑧 such that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑧 ∼ 0 ⊕ 𝑦. For any near
outcome 𝑥 and any far good 𝑦, there is a near outcome 𝑤 such that
𝑤 ⊕ 𝑦 ∼ 𝑥 ⊕ 0.
This lets us run compensation “downward”: not only can we offset mak-
ing nearby things worse by making far away things sufficiently better, but
also we can offset making nearby things better by making far away things
sufficiently worse.
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Negative Compensation implies that we can also extend arithmetic progres-
sions of outcomes downward: so Positive and Negative Compensation to-
gether tell us that for any pair of near (far) outcomes 𝑥0, 𝑥1 can be extended
to an arithmetic progression …, 𝑥−2, 𝑥−1, 𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, …. Outcome Separa-
bility implies that if 𝑥0 ≺ 𝑥1 then each outcome in the sequence is better
than those before it.
Theorem 5. Stochastic Dominance, Negative Reflection, Background Indepen-
dence, and Positive and Negative Compensation together imply Fanaticism.
The theorem follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Positive and Negative Compensation and Outcome Separability to-
gether imply that for any good 𝑥 and any probability 𝑝 > 0, there is a prospect
𝑌 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 and an independent prospect 𝐵 such that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝐵 is stochastically
dominated by 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐵.
(The key difference from lemma 1 is that the background prospect 𝐵 is now
required to be independent of 𝑌 ; but it can no longer be guaranteed to be a
simple prospect.)
From lemma 2, we can apply the same reasoning as in section 3: by Stochas-
tic Dominance, 𝑥⊕𝐵 ≺ 𝑌 ⊕𝐵; by Negative Reflection, 𝐵 must have some
possible outcome 𝑏 such that 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑏 ≺ 𝑌 ⊕ 𝑏; so by Background Indepen-
dence 𝑥 ≺ 𝑌 .
Proof sketch for lemma 2. This is essentially the same as Tarsney’s “Suffi-
ciency Theorem” (2020), adapted to our more general setting, so we will
not go into details. Here is the main idea.
Let 𝑥 be a near good. Our Compensation principles tell us that there is an
infinite arithmetic progression of far goods … , 𝑧−2, 𝑧−1, 𝑧0, 𝑧1, 𝑧2 …, with
difference 𝑥, where 𝑧0 = 0. We let these be the possible outcomes of the
background prospect 𝐵. We assign these outcomes probabilities that are
sufficiently spread out. A discrete Laplace distribution will do:
𝛽(𝑛) = 𝛼 2−|𝑞𝑛|
where 𝛼 is a normalization constant and 𝑞 < 𝑝/2. The smaller the proba-
bility 𝑝 is, the wider this distribution will be. Then we let 𝑦 be a near good
which is as good as some good enough far outcome 𝑧𝑁 (𝑁 > 1/𝑞). It can
be shown that if 𝑌 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦, and 𝑌 and 𝐵 are independent, then 𝑌 ⊕ 𝐵
stochastically dominates 𝑥 ⊕ 𝐵.
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Theorem 6. Stochastic Dominance and Negative Reflection together imply that
Fanaticism is false.
Proof. First, by Fanaticism we can construct a fast-growing sequence of out-
comes: 𝑥1 = 0, and for each 𝑛 > 1, 𝑥𝑛 is an outcome such that 2−𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑛 ≻
𝑥𝑛−1.
Weflip two coins—CoinA andCoin B—until each of themhas landed heads.
Let 𝐴𝑛 be the event where Coin A first comes up heads on the 𝑛th flip, and
similarly for 𝐵𝑛. So
𝑃(𝐴𝑚𝐵𝑛) = 2−(𝑚+𝑛) for each 𝑚, 𝑛 ≥ 1
Let 𝑋 be a prospect that has outcome 𝑥𝑚 in each event 𝐴𝑚. Then (by
Stochastic Dominance) for each 𝑛 > 1,
𝑋 ≻ 2−𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑛 ≻ 𝑥𝑛−1
This also holds conditional on each event 𝐵𝑛 (since 𝑋 is independent of
these events).
Let 𝑌 be a prospect that has outcome 𝑥𝑛+1 in each event 𝐵𝑛. Then 𝑌
stochastically dominates 𝑋; so 𝑌 ≻ 𝑋. But the events 𝐵𝑛 form a regu-
lar partition, and conditional on each event 𝐵𝑛, 𝑌 is just as good as 𝑥𝑛+1,
while 𝑋 is strictly better than 𝑥𝑛+1. So 𝑌 is not better than 𝑋 conditional
on any 𝐵𝑛, which contradicts Negative Reflection.
The Sure Thing Principle. For any event 𝐸 such that 𝑃(𝐸) > 0, for any
prospects 𝑋 and 𝑌 such that 𝑋 ∼¬𝐸 𝑌 ,
𝑋 ≾ 𝑌 iff 𝑋 ≾𝐸 𝑌
We’ll use the notation (𝑝 ∗ 𝑋, (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑌 ) for an arbitrary prospect such
that the chance of any outcome 𝑥 is
𝑝 ⋅ 𝑃 [𝑋 = 𝑥] + 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑃 [𝑌 = 𝑥]
We simplify (𝑝 ∗ 𝑋, (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 0) to 𝑝 ∗ 𝑋.
The Sure Thing Principle and Stochastic Equivalence together imply:
Independence. For any prospects 𝑋, 𝑌 , 𝑍, and any probability 𝑝 > 0,
𝑋 ≾ 𝑌 iff (𝑝 ∗ 𝑋, (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑍) ≾ (𝑝 ∗ 𝑌 , (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑍)
36
We also suppose:
Simple Comparability. For any good outcome 𝑥 and bad outcome 𝑦,
(12 ∗ 𝑥,
1




2 ∗ 𝑦) ≾ 0
Theorem 7. The Sure Thing Principle, Stochastic Dominance, Background In-
dependence, Positive and Negative Compensation, and Simple Comparability to-
gether imply that at least one of Positive Fanaticism or Negative Fanaticism is
true.
Proof. The proof has three steps.
Step 1. If Negative Fanaticism is false, there exists a bad outcome 𝑥 such
that for all 𝑦, 1/2 ∗ 𝑦 ⊀ 𝑥.
If Negative Fanaticism is false, thismeans that there is a bad outcome𝑥 such
that for some probability 𝑝 > 0, for all bad outcomes 𝑦, 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ⊀ 𝑥. Call a
probability 𝑝 nice iff it has the property that 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ⊀ 𝑥 for all bad outcomes
𝑦. There are two cases to consider.
1. Some 𝑝 ≥ 1/2 is nice. Suppose 𝑦 is a bad outcome such that 12 ∗𝑦 ≺ 𝑥.
Then by Stochastic Dominance (or Independence),
𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ≾ 12 ∗ 𝑦 ≺ 𝑥
This contradicts the assumption that 𝑝 is nice. So there is no such 𝑦.
2. No 𝑝 ≥ 1/2 is nice. In that case there is some nice 𝑝 < 1/2 such
that 2𝑝 is not nice: that is, there is some bad outcome 𝑥′ such that
2𝑝∗𝑥′ ≺ 𝑥. Now suppose that 𝑦 is a bad outcome such that 12 ∗𝑦 ≺ 𝑥′.
By Independence,
𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ≾ 2𝑝 ∗ 𝑥′ ≺ 𝑥
This contradicts the assumption that 𝑝 is nice.
Step 2. For any good outcome 𝑥, there is an arithmetic progression 𝑥−, 0, 𝑥+
such that 𝑥 ≾ 𝑥+, and
(12 ∗ 𝑥
−, 12 ∗ 𝑥
+) ≿ 0
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Let 𝑦− be a bad outcome as given by Step 1; without loss of generality we
can suppose 𝑦− is a far outcome (by Exact Compensation). Exact Compensa-
tion ensures that there is an arithmetic progression 𝑦−, 0, 𝑦+ with difference
𝑑. For any outcome 𝑧, we can choose a far outcome 𝑧′ such that 𝑧 ∼ 𝑑 ⊕ 𝑧′.
The property from Step 1 tells us:
(12 ∗ 𝑧
′, 12 ∗ 0) ⊀ 𝑦
−










Now let 𝑥+ = 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦−. This is better than either 𝑥 or 𝑦+, since they are each
good (using Outcome Separability). And there is an arithmetic progression
𝑥−, 0, 𝑥+, such that (by Independence),
(12 ∗ 𝑥
−, 12 ∗ 𝑥
+) ≿ (12 ∗ 𝑥
−, 12 ∗ 𝑦
+) ≿ 0
Step 3. Deduce Positive Fanaticism.
We can show by induction that for each 𝑛 > 0, there is some (near) good
outcome 𝑦 such that
1
𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 ≿ 𝑥
+







−) ≿ (12 ∗ 𝑥
+, 12 ∗ 𝑥
−) ≿ 0




𝑛 + 1 ∗ 𝑦,
𝑛
𝑛 + 1 ∗ 𝑥
−)
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(and 0 can be rewritten as 𝑛+12𝑛 ∗ 0), so by Independence,
( 1𝑛 + 1 ∗ 𝑦,
𝑛
𝑛 + 1 ∗ 𝑥
−) ≿ 0
Background Independence lets us add 𝑧 to each outcome.
( 1𝑛 + 1 ∗ (𝑦 ⊕ 𝑧),
𝑛
𝑛 + 1 ∗ 0) ≿ 𝑥
+
Finally, by Exact Compensation, there is a near outcome 𝑦′ such that 𝑦′⊕0 ∼
𝑦 ⊕ 𝑧, and we have
1
𝑛 + 1 ∗ 𝑦
′ ≿ 𝑥+
completing the induction.
Finally, for any probability 𝑝 > 0, we can choose 𝑛 such that 1/𝑛 < 𝑝. For
some good 𝑦,
𝑝 ∗ 𝑦 ≻ 1𝑛 ∗ 𝑦 ≿ 𝑥
+ ≿ 𝑥
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